Open Problems

Unsolved questions worth building around.
The edge of what we know and what we still must figure out.

Aug 13, 2026 Markus Maiwald

What Happens When Code Stops Being Scarce

AI can reproduce your open source project in seconds, not a skeleton, a working, tested, documented reimplementation that is functionally equivalent and often cleaner. The three standard responses (boosterism, legalism, denial) all answer the wrong question. The real question is what gave open source its value in the first place, and the answer is scarcity. Not code scarcity; production scarcity. The bottleneck was the number of people who could turn a well-understood problem into a correct implementation fast enough. That bottleneck was the entire economic foundation of open source cultural capital. AI collapses it for the majority of what ships, the thousandth REST client, the hundredth ORM wrapper, the fiftiety CLI parser. The danger is not theft, it is flooding: the attention pipeline (review bandwidth, trust heuristics, dependency-graph positioning) was calibrated for a human flow rate and breaks at machine rate. Three layers retain value: discovery (naming a problem before it is well-understood), trust (a generated implementation is worth nothing until someone runs it in production for months), and proof of work (sustained human attention, the one thing that cannot be faked at scale). Value migrates from implementation to curation. The contributor of 2020 was valued for writing code; the contributor of 2028 will be valued for selecting it. The skill shifts from production to discrimination, from Hemingway to Maxwell Perkins. The projects that thrive will be built on the scarce layers from day one, opinionated architecture, active curation, human trust as the product. Some won't have much code at all. They'll have judgment. And judgment, for now, remains stubbornly, defiantly human.

#ai#open-source#economics
Aug 9, 2026 Markus Maiwald

The Singularity Has No Date

The 1960 Science essay 'Doomsday' fit two millennia of world population growth to a formula and the formula ran to a single point: Friday, November 13, 2026. Sixty-six years later, two of the most powerful men in technology started talking about exactly such a date. This piece takes the word singularity back to its mathematical root, the point where 1 divided by x breaks at zero, and separates two curves that look alike from a distance: exponential growth, which always has a computable value, and hyperbolic growth, 1 over (T minus t), which tears at a fixed calendar date T. Five people tried to define a technological singularity: von Neumann, Good, Vinge, Kurzweil, Solomonoff. Only Solomonoff wrote equations you can test. His test says watch whether the doubling time between major AI capability leaps is itself shrinking. The best data we have, from METR, says it is: from 196 days across the full series, to 130 days for models since 2023, to 88 days for 2024 models, each step roughly two-thirds of the last. The condition looks met. It also looks untrustworthy: the task set changed, a calculation error was corrected by up to twenty percent, and the ceiling above sixteen hours is admitted unreliable. Then the 1960 paper itself returns as the precedent: the population curve that held for two thousand years simply bent, because its assumption broke against reality. Singularities in data do not end the world; they announce a regime change. The real singularity has no date. It is the moment your personal re-adaptation time becomes longer than the doubling time outside, and you start chasing a state that is already obsolete when you reach it. We are having an End of the World party on Friday the thirteenth, knowing it goes on after.

#ai#singularity#epistemology